Introduction and summary
Since firms pay a premium over the market price when they repurchase their common stock through a general tender offer, the price of the remaining shares should, ceteris paribus, fall. However, Masulis (1980b) , Dann (1981) , Vermaelen (1981) and Rosenfeld (1982) find that the price of the remaining shares after the termination of an intratirm tender offer is significantly above the price prior to its announcement. Dann (1980) and Vermaelen further show that an open market repurchase also has a positive impact on the price of the remaining shares. This evidence indicates that common share repurchases through tender offers and open market purchases are in general consistent with the hypothesis that corporate managers act in their shareholders' interest. In this paper, we examine stock repurchases which restrict participation to a particular sub-set of a firm's stockholders. These targeted groups include insiders, other corporations and shareholders owning less than 100 shares. We find that repurchases from insiders and small shareholders increase the wealth of non-participating stockholders and are therefore consistent with the shareholders' interest hypothesis. However, privately negotiated repurchases of single blocks from individuals unaffiliated with the firm and other corporations reduce the wealth of non-participating stockholders. In order to examine the motivation behind these single block repurchases, we isolate those cases in which the repurchase signals the termination of a take-over attempt. For the sellers in this 'merger' subsample, the unusually large premium received for the block fully offsets the market's negative response to the termination of the take-over bid. But for repurchasing firms, the payment of this premium, which averages 19x, compounds the negative effect of the lost take-over opportunity, and the non-participating shareholders suffer a significant wealth loss. We believe that this evidence is inconsistent with the shareholders' interest hypothesis. The results suggest that the managers of these repurchasing firms, acting in their own interest, are able to 'bribe' the sellers into abandoning profitable take-overs.
Sample design
An initial sample of targeted repurchases for the period 19741980 was collected from The Wall Street Journal Index. For 1978 For -1980 , the 'Reacquired Shares' entry in the 'General News' section of the annual index was the primary source. Data for earlier years were obtained by an exhaustive reading of the annual 'Corporate News' section. The dates were then checked with the relevant issues of The Wall Street Journal. The final sample also met the following criteria:
(1) No other information concerning the company was reported in The Wall Street Journal in the three-day period surrounding the targeted share repurchase date.
(2) There were no problems in dating the announcement and the repurchase was not part of a previously announced plan.
(3) The bid to repurchase the block was successful.
(4) Daily rates of return on the common stock are available for the 300 days before the announcement on the CRSP file of companies quoted on the New York and American exchanges.
The final sample of small share repurchases consists of 15 repurchase offers made to shareholders owning less than 100 shares in the period [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] . The range of the premium over market price offered is from 0% to 45x, with a mean of 10% and a median of 9%.
The final sample of single block repurchases consists of 86 repurchases from insiders, individuals unaffiliated with the firm and other corporations in the period 19741980.
Twenty-four of these blocks were repurchased at discounts from the market price. However, these discounts are calculated relative to the closing price two days prior to the offer announcement and, for all but one of these repurchases, the offer price was greater than the lowest daily market price reported during the previous month. The summary statistics presented in table 1 for this sample show that the blocks repurchased from corporations and individuals are slightly larger and receive higher premia than those repurchased from insiders, estates and foundations.
Single block repurchases

Alternative hypotheses
The curious aspect of single block repurchases is that they are generally made at a premium above market, which implies a wealth-loss for the nonparticipating shareholders. This immediately raises the interesting question: Do managers act in their shareholders' interest when repurchasing single blocks at a premium?
There are numerous ways in which a single block repurchase -even at a premium -could increase the wealth of the non-participating stockholders. The repurchase could signal favorable inside information to the market, or cause a value-increasing change in the firm's capital structure. For example, one company in our sample stated that the single block repurchase 'demonstrates the confidence of this management and our board of directors in (the firm's) future', and several companies noted that the block repurchase was being financed by loans. Some companies repurchased the block for 'general corporate purposes', noting that this new treasury stock would be used for employee benefit plans, stock dividends or future acquisitions. Several companies explained that they repurchased a block to preclude the selling firm from distributing the block to its stockholders, thereby increasing the company's servicing costs. These are all valid reasons for a firm to repurchase its own shares, and purchasing a single block -as opposed to a general tender offer -may be the more efficient way of accomplishing one of these objectives. Brokerage fees are avoided and information dissemination and collection costs are vastly reduced by reacquiring shares through one large, single block transaction. bThe block repurchase price compared to the closing price two days before the announcement. 'One corporate repurchase from 1974 is included in the final sample.
Other reasons given for block repurchases involve the costs of having another company control a significant fraction of a firm's voting stock. Many repurchases in our sample ended litigation concerning the purchase of the initial block, tender offers and proxy lights and were justified as actions which ended 'disruptive efforts to elect representatives to the board and influence management' or resolved 'disputes that could have seriously affected the conduct of business.' These costs of outside disruptions may be quite substantial.
Uncertainty about the future nature (existence) of the firm could increase the costs of contracting with customers, suppliers and employees. Moreover, having representatives on the board of directors whose primary interest is the welfare of the stockholders of another firm could pose serious problems in formulating optimal business strategies. As Dann and DeAngelo (1982) point out, eliminating these outside disruptions through a block repurchase could very well increase the value of the repurchasing firm. All of the above explanations for single block repurchases are consistent with the hypothesis that managers act in their shareholders' interest. Any one could explain why a block repurchase could lead to an increase in the value of a repurchasing firm. There is, however, an alternative hypothesis to explain single block repurchases. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) view the firm as a set of contracts among managers, workers, bondholders and stockholders.
Within this 'nexus of contracts', one of the more valuable benefits for a manager is his effective control of the firm, which allows him to pursue his own interests subject to the arrangements made by the principals to monitor his performance as their agent. In this context, the positive costs of writing and enforcing contracts preclude the shareholders from completely eliminating aberrant managerial activities. But concentrated shareholdings do provide a tighter constraint on the resulting managerial inefficiency than dispersed shareholdings since the marginal benefit of monitoring the manager is higher and the cost of removing the manager is lower for large shareholders.
This theory of agency implies that managers repurchase a single block of common stock to reduce the probability of losing control of the firm's resources. Our sample provides several instances in which nonparticipating stockholders accused the managers of protecting their own interests. For example, one shareholder lawsuit specifically charged that the 'firm's recent purchase of 293,800 of its shares from Crane Co. was made for no other reason than to keep Morrison-Knudsen's management and directors in office'.
The divergence between these two hypotheses is most noticeable for blocks repurchased at a premium over market. The wealth transfer implied by this premium should, ceteris paribus, cause the price of the remaining shares to fall. If the shareholders' interest hypothesis is correct, managers will only accept a project if it has positive net present value for their shareholders.
This implies that the wealth transfer will be offset by a concomitant wealthenhancing effect such that the price of the remaining shares rises. In contrast, the managers' interest hypothesis posits that there will be no such offset. Furthermore, if the block repurchase reduces the threat of a take-over and thereby allows managers to deviate further from value-maximizing behavior, the remaining shareholders will suffer an additional loss.
In the next section, we test these competing hypotheses and also analyze the returns to the shares of the selling companies.
Time series analysis
Methodology
In order to test the competing hypotheses of the previous subsection, we use the simple 'market' model where Rjt is the simple rate of return for security j on day t and R",, is the simple rate of return for the CRSP equally weighted market index on day t. We use it to estimate the alpha and beta of the common stock of each of the companies in the sample for the 240 trading day period ending 61 trading days before the announcement date: the day on which The Wall Street Journal first publishes the news of the repurchase.' These estimates are then used to calculate the abnormal return of each security for the following 121 trading days according to the equation
where AR, is the abnormal return to security j on day t, where t is equal to zero on the announcement date, is negative for days before the announcement and is positive for days after the announcement.
In analyzing the time series of abnormal returns, we report statistics based on two time periods: three-day returns from t = -1 through t = 1 and twentyday returns from t = -1 through t = 18. The first time period is intended to capture the market's immediate reaction to the announcement of a repurchase; the second is intended to capture the market's assessment of the implications of this repurchase on share valuations. Because of our selection criteria, there is reason to believe that the full implication of the repurchase 'See Fama (1976) for details of this methodology.
The Dimson (1979) technique, using I?,,,_ 1, k, and k,,, as the independent variables, was also employed. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported here, with the t-statistics on the abnormal returns being more significant because of lower standard errors.
will not be reflected in market values within the three days surrounding the offer.
In order to be included in our sample, a repurchase agreement must not only have been announced but it must have been executed as well. For any repurchase announcement, there is some uncertainty as to whether or not the repurchase will be completed. Before it can be executed, the agreement must be approved by the firm's board of directors and its stockholders, at a special meeting. Also, stockholder suits to enjoin the repurchase must be adjudicated before the agreement can be carried out. As the uncertainty about these issues is resolved in the period following the initial announcement, the probability of repurchase for the 'successfully completed' sample (i.e., our sample) must go to one, causing a drift in the cumulative abnormal return to the portfolio.
The effect of single block repurchases on the wealth of participating and non-participating stockholders
The average abnormal return on day t and the cumulative average abnormal return to day t from 60 days before the announcement of the offer for the portfolios of repurchasing and selling firms are presented in While the above results indicate that a share repurchase is a wealthreducing event for non-participating shareholders, they do not imply malfeasance on the part of the repurchasing firm's managers. Many of the %e three-day f-statistic is calculated using the standard deviation of the 80 three-day abnormal returns to the portfolio over the 240-day period used to estimate the market model parameters.
This methodology is used throughout this paper to calculate the standard errors of the reported CAR statistics. See Masulis (1980a) and Dann (1981) for a detailed description and justification of this estimator of the standard error. repurchases in our sample mark the termination of an attempt by the selling firm to acquire control of the repurchasing firm. The fall in the price of the shares of the repurchasing firm may simply reflect the discovery by the selling firm that the repurchasing firm does not, after all, possess the specialized resource that is necessary for a profitable acquisition.
We examine the effect of merger terminations on our results in the next section. In an attempt to isolate the influence of merger terminations on our results, we divide the sample into two sub-samples.
Merger terminations
In the first sub-sample we group all offers which we suspect mark the termination of a take-over attempt by the seller; all other repurchases are grouped into the second, 'non-merger', sub-set.
The merger termination sample consists of 21 repurchases. Thirteen of these are from selling firms who had initially bought the block within the previous 12 months and had announced a desire to seek control of the repurchasing firm. All of these sellers stated that the repurchase marked the end of their take-over plans. An additional 4 repurchases are from recognized conglomerates who had purchased the block within the previous 12 months and showed no further interest in the repurchasing firm. The other 4 are included because the repurchase was accompanied by a 'standstill' agreement, which is a contract precluding the selling firm from buying the repurchasing firm's shares for some stipulated period.3
The 'non-merger' sample consists of 40 repurchases. Thirty-four were from individuals or firms who initially bought the lit-m's shares more than 12 months before the repurchase agreement. Thirty of these 34 buyers never announced an intent to acquire the repurchasing firm; 4 had done so but, previous to the repurchase agreement, had announced that they were abandoning their take-over attempt. The impact of a merger termination on the wealth of non-participating stockholders of repurchasing firms is reported in Thus, it appears that any negative effect of the merger termination on the value of the selling firm is more than offset by the premium paid by the repurchasing firm.
For the portfolio of 'non-merger' repurchasing firms, the 1.4% loss in value of the non-participating shares in the three days surrounding the block repurchase is inconsistent with the shareholders' interest hypothesis and provides some support -albeit weak since the relevant t-statistic is -1.97 -for the managers' interest hypothesis. The evidence from the portfolio of 'merger' repurchasing firms is less clear, since the substantial wealth-loss sustained by the non-participating stockholders may be caused by a 'merger termination' effect. In the next section, we concentrate on isolating the effect of a take-over termination by analyzing the returns, net of the repurchase premium, to participating and non-participating shareholders.
Cross-sectional analysis
The cross-sectional means of the fraction of the firm's shares repurchased, F, the premium paid by the non-participating stockholders, n, and the premium received by the seller, n*, are presented in table 5.
The statistics in table 5 show that while the means of the fraction of the firm repurchased, F, are almost identical for the 'merger' and 'non-merger' sub-samples, the average repurchase premium paid, f, is more than three times greater for the 'merger' sample than for the 'non-merger' sample (the difference is almost 14% with a t-statistic of 2.57). Furthermore, the mean premium received by the selling firms as a percentage of their pre-offer values, 7c*, is also higher for the 'merger' sample (although the difference is not statistically significant), But if the termination of a take-over attempt is a value-decreasing event for target firms, why then are the shares of these 'merger' firms repurchased at higher premiums? To answer this question, we develop estimates of the wealth-effect of the block repurchase, net of the repurchase premium.
Following Bradley (1980) and Rosenfeld (1982) we note that if the repurchase offer contains information, the relevant price for measuring any Table 5 The revaluation, net of the repurchase premium, of the assets of firms involved in the repurchase wealth transfer is the 'with information' share value, P,, rather than the preoffer share price, P,. Thus the total premium received by the seller of a single block totalling N, shares at a price PB, N, (P,-P,,) , consists of a wealth transfer, N, (P, -P,) , and an information effect N, (P, -PO) . Similarly, the post-repurchase share price, P,, of the remaining shares, (No -NJ, will reflect both the wealth transferred, (No-N,) .
(P, -P,), and the information effect, (No-NJ
. (P, -P,) . The informational impact of the repurchase on the total value of the repurchasing firm, N,(P, -PO), can be reformulated as
No(P1 -PO) = NLdPl -PO) + (No -N,). (P, -PO)
= NB{(pB-po) -(P* -Pl,>
Since, for an all-equity firm, the wealth received by the seller, NB(PB-P,), equals the wealth transferred from the non-participating shareholders, (No-N,) . (P, -P,), we can cancel these terms, leaving
NOV, -PO) = N,(PlJ -PO) + (No -NrJ) (PE -PO).
Dividing through by N,P,, and noting that F is the fraction of the firm's shares repurchased, we obtain
Then, defining O_ 1, T as the information-induced percentage change in the value of the assets of the repurchasing firm, and noting that rc is the percentage premium over the pre-offer price, we can write
where R-,,, is the realized percentage return to the shares of the repurchasing firm from one day before the announcement through day 7: Empirically, we use the abnormal performance index, APL 1, T, to estimate this return, where API_,,,= fi (ItAR,)-1.
r=-1
If the repurchase premium is the only effect involved, and therefore P, equals PO, then the price of the remaining non-participating shares will adjust to reflect just the wealth transfer involved. This value decrease,
(1 -F)'@-I,,, will offset the total premium received by the seller, F. TC, and f3 will be zero. If a block repurchase also conveys positive information concerning the repurchasing firm, and therefore P, exceeds P,, then the decrease in value of the remaining shares will be less than the total premium received by the seller of the block and 0 will be positive. In contrast, if a merger termination is implied by the repurchase announcement, with negative implications for the shares of the repurchasing company, then 8 will be negative.
Since the total wealth transferred to the selling firm equals N, (P,-P,) , the informational impact on the value of the selling firm is given by
N;(P: -P6) = NZ(P,* -PZ) -N,(P, -PO),
where all of the variables are defined above and the * superscript refers to the selling firm. Dividing through by NgPg and taking percentages, e* l,T=RE1,T-n*.
14)
If the block repurchase signals positive information about the selling firm, then f?,,.
will be positive; if the repurchase conveys bad news about the selling firm, then 8' I, T will be negative.
The average information effect, as measured by the 8-i, 1 and 8-r,,, estimates reported in table 5, for the sample of 'non-merger' repurchasing firms is positive, albeit insignificantly different from zero. This implies that, for these non-participating shareholders, the negative impact of the wealth transfer is the dominant effect involved in single block repurchases. For the repurchasing firms in the 'merger' sample. the results are quite different. The information effect is definitely negative, since I% r, 1 is -2.7% with a t-statistic of -2.3, and @_ i, ia is -6.8% with a t-statistic of -4.1. This suggests that a block repurchase that signals the termination of a pending merger bid significantly reduces the value of the repurchasing firm beyond the wealth-transfer associated with the repurchase premium. The average information effect, as measured by the 8?,, 1 and &,, 18 estimates reported in table 5, for the sample of 'non-merger' selling firms is also insignificantly different from zero. For these repurchases, the gain to participating stockholders can be fully 'explained' by the repurchase premium. But the returns to the selling firms in the 'merger' sample indicate a small negative information effect: the 8% i, 1 statistic is insignificant, but e* 1,18 is -3.25% with a t-statistic of -2.14. By this estimate, the market appears to have anticipated a value-increasing acquisition by the prospective acquiring firm, and responds to the termination of the take-over attempt by slightly devaluing the selling firm's shares.
Given these results, the question arises: Why do the managers of the acquiring firm abandon the take-over attempt? One possible explanation is An alternative explanation is that, although the proposed acquisition is a positive net present value project, the managers of the acquiring firm are induced to abandon their take-over plans and sell their holding because of the significant premium offered by the managers of the repurchasing firm. By repurchasing this block, these managers secure greater control of the repurchasing firm at the expense of their remaining stockholders. This hypothesis is consistent with the evidence presented above.
To summarize, we consider that the data presented in table 5 are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the managers of repurchasing firms are acting in their stockholder's interestparticularly when the repurchase signals the termination of a take-over attempt, In such a case, the data suggest that the intent of the managers of repurchasing firms in repurchasing the block is to thwart a profitable take-over, presumably to enhance their own welfare.
As a final test of the effects of a merger termination, we combine the 'merger' and 'non-merger' samples and regress the change in wealth of the stockholders on the total premium paid, N,(P,-PO), and a 'merger' dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the observation is in the 'merger' sample and 0 otherwise. d W = y,, + y,(repurchase premium) + yz('merger') + y,(fraction repurchased) + y,('standstill') + E, Regression estimates of the effect on the wealth of the shareholders bThe repurchase premium is the total premium above the pre-offer price paid to the seller, measured in thousands of dollars.
d W* = yz + y:(repurchase premium) + yq('merger') + E*.
If these regressions are correctly specified, we expect y1 = -1 and y: = 1. In addition, the estimates of y2 and yz will give an indication of the effect of a merger termination on the value of the repurchasing and selling firms, respectively.
The results of the cross-section regressions specified above are reported in table 6. The repurchase premium coefficients for the repurchasing and selling firms, ji and 77, are insignificantly different from their theoretical values of -1 and 1, respectively.
The estimated constants of the regressions indicate that, on average, the repurchasing shareholders lose an additional $3.4 million and the selling shareholders gain an additional $29.5 million (although the r-statistics in both cases are insignificant). But more importantly, the significantly negative 'merging' dummy variables indicate that repurchases that mark the termination of a take-over attempt reduce the values of both firms, abstracting from the repurchase premium. This loss averages $10.1 million for repurchasing shareholders and $47.1 million for selling shareholders.
An additional variable in the repurchasing equation, the fraction repurchased, is marginally significant. We interpret its positive coefficient to imply that the remaining shareholders are better off if the given level of premium is paid for a larger rather than a smaller block. We also included a leverage measure in eq. (5) 
'Insider' repurchases
In his study of secondary distributions of large blocks, Scholes (1972) finds that when corporations and corporate officers sell a block of shares, the average abnormal return to the remaining shares on the day of the sale is -1.1% and the cumulative average abnormal return from the day of the sale to 10 days after the secondary distribution is -2.1%. He interprets this wealth loss as a rc:iction h! the market to the disclosure of the identity of the sellers -'insiders' who are presumed to possess adverse information. The purpose of this section is to complement Scholes's results by analyzing the sales of blocks by corporate officers to their own companies. The summary statistics for our sample of 15 repurchases from corporate officers and 10 repurchases from the estates of deceased corporate officers and from foundations created by such insiders are presented in table 1. The times series methodology discussed in section 3 is used to examine these repurchases.
We analyzed the sub-groups separately, but the results were identical for the two groups. Therefore, we combined the data into 'insiders' sample and report results for this entire group. The market reaction to the announcement of block repurchases from insiders is shown in table 7 and fig. 4 . This reaction is significantly different from that presented in section 3 for single block repurchases.
Rather than being negative, as implied by the repurchase premium, the CAR_ 1, 1 statistic is 1.21% with a t-statistic of 1.15, and the CAR_,,,, statistic is 1.00% with a t-statistic of 0.38. Furthermore, the cross-sectional analysis of the change in asset values, net of the repurchase premium, confirms the existence of an offsetting positive effect: our estimate of the information effect, 8_ i, i, is 1.72% with a t-statistic of 1.61.
This slight wealth gain is especially interesting when contrasted to the wealth loss reported by Scholes. If the market cannot costlessly differentiate between sales by insiders possessing adverse economic information and sales by insiders for purely portfolio reasons, then the price of the remaining shares may decrease in the short-run even when the insider sale is part of a portfolio rebalancing strategy. In such an instance, repurchase of the insider block by the company may solve the asymmetric information problem involved by signaling the absence of adverse economic information to the market. In response to this signal, the price of the remaining shares will not fall, and may indeed rise. In contrast, a decision by the company not to repurchase a block from an insider before it is offered to the market through a secondary distribution may confirm that adverse economic information is involved. In order to test this hypothesis, we use the standard cumulative abnormal return analysis described in section 3. There is a positive average abnormal return of 1.25% on the day before the announcement and the abnormal return for the three days surrounding the announcement is 0.92% with t-statistics of 1.78 and 0.90, respectively. This evidence weakly favors the hypothesis that companies, in repurchasing small shareholdings, decrease shareholder servicing costs. This suggests that one of the reasons given for large block repurchases -to reduce servicing costsis consistent with the shareholders' interest hypothesis. However, several colleagues have pointed out that the one-day return of 1.25% is quite large compared with a priori estimates of the decrease in servicing costs. The result is therefore also consistent with the hypothesis that managers are using the small shareholding repurchase to signal positive information to the market.
Repurchases of small shareholdings
Conclusions
Several authors have studied the wealth effects of the various forms of share repurchases.
The results of these studies are reported in table 9. Analyzing intratirm tender offers, Masulis (1980b ), Dann (1981 , Vermaelen (1981) and Rosenfeld (1982) all find that the average value of the remaining shares, rather than falling by 4% to reflect the premium paid to the tendering shareholders, actually rises by 15% as a result of the repurchase. Although they disagree as to the cause of this off-setting positive wealth effect, they all conclude that their results are consistent with the shareholders' interest Neg.' hypothesis. Vermaelen's (1981) results for open market repurchases and our results for targeted repurchases from insiders and small shareholders are consistent with this conclusion.
The data presented in this paper and in Dann and DeAngelo (1983) indicate that the repurchase of a single block implies an average wealth loss of l-2'% for the remaining stockholders of the repurchasing firm. But our evidence reveals no off-setting positive effects. Indeed, the wealth loss of the non-participating shareholders of these firms is significantly greater: Dann and DeAngelo document a 6% loss and we find a 4% loss in value. Moreover, our results show that this wealth-loss is much greater (13%) for repurchases that mark the termination of a take-over bid. While a greater wealth-loss is to be expected in the wake of the termination of a take-over bid, the fact that these repurchases are effected at significantly higher premiums appears to be inconsistent with the shareholders' interest hypothesis.
The evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the hypothesis that a single block repurchase from another corporation is used by the managers of the repurchasing firm to eliminate a threat to their control over the firm. In a sense, they use the repurchase premium to bribe the selling stockholder into giving up his interest in the firm and, by implication, cease monitoring the firm's activities. As a result, the managers of the repurchasing firm are able to pursue an operating strategy that is more in line with their own interests and less in line with those of their stockholders.
It must be stressed that we do not view this evidence as a blanket indictment against the shareholders' interest hypothesis. Indeed, a block repurchase from another corporation is a relatively rare event. Nevertheless, based on our analysis, we conclude that these transactions do not generally enhance the welfare of the stockholders of the repurchasing firm. This raises an interesting question as to why boards of directors and shareholders vote their approval for such repurchases. We found that, for our sample, six lawsuits had been tiled by shareholders attempting to thwart single block repurchases.
In one case, the company responded by converting the repurchase into a general tender offer. In the other five cases, however, the managers of the repurchasing firm argued that the premium was justified in order to remove from the company 'outside influences inimical to the shareholders' best interests'. The courts were sympathetic to this argument and consistently ruled in favor of the managers. The evidence presented in this paper casts serious doubt on the wisdom of these judicial rulings.
